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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
Will States Step Up in 2020? We Hope So
by Darien Shanske and David Gamage
We offer no predictions about the next year 
in tax, but we will offer what we hope will 
happen — if not next year, then soon. To 
paraphrase Chief Justice John Roberts, we hope 
that when it comes to the taxation of 
multinational corporations in particular, states 
will act more like the “separate and 
independent sovereigns” that they are.1
Many of the reasons for a rethink of state 
public finance systems have long been noted. 
States are bound by balanced budget rules, but 
often rely on volatile revenue sources. More 
stable tax bases, like the sales tax and the 
property tax bases, are riddled with design 
flaws, from the sales tax base not including 
services and intangibles to the property tax 
failing to provide substantial, and automatic, 
circuit breakers. The corporate tax continues to 
yield less as corporations earn more.
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act offered states a 
chance to take up the challenges relating to the 
corporate tax in particular, but in most cases 
they have not done so. Take the repatriation.2 A 
sizeable portion of this money should have been 
taxed by the states to begin with — not just 
because the states also lose when corporations 
shift income out of the United States. In 
addition, corporations were incentivized by the 
likelihood of another federal repatriation 
holiday to strip out more income from the 
domestic corporate tax base than they might 
otherwise. In other words, one piece of poor 
federal tax policy (repatriation holidays) was 
exacerbating another piece of poor federal tax 
policy (the porous corporate tax regime).
There were — and are — additional reasons 
to tax the repatriation. For one, the repatriation 
was taxed at a bargain rate at the federal level, 
then this one-time money was squandered to 
pay for permanent tax cuts. A state-level tax 
could correct this to some extent. And because 
the repatriation also represents an inelastic tax 
base, states could resolutely resist the (usually 
specious) argument that companies would 
move if the state pursued a tax policy that the 
companies did not like.
Darien Shanske is a professor at the 
University of California, Davis, School of Law 
(King Hall), and David Gamage is a professor of 
law at Indiana University Maurer School of 
Law.
In this installment of Academic Perspectives 
on SALT, the authors express hope that more 
states will take advantage of opportunities 
under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act by taxing 
repatriated income and conforming to the 
global intangible low-taxed income and the 
base erosion and antiabuse tax regimes.
1
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 579 
(2012).
2
Most of these arguments are drawn from Darien Shanske and David 
Gamage, “Why (and How) States Should Tax the Repatriation,” State Tax 
Notes, Apr. 23, 2018, p. 317.
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And the states have needs — including 
infrastructure, rainy day funds, pension 
shortfalls, and softening the blow of the 
state and local tax cap. We certainly understand 
why not all states pursued taxing the 
repatriation, but virtually none? How can that 
be?
One explanation is ideological, namely that 
states with voters who liked the TCJA would 
not wish to act in a way that is arguably 
inconsistent with it. We have no idea if this is a 
true explanation, but if it is then it signals part 
of the problem. All politics is supposed to be 
local, not national. If the federal government — 
with its ability to deficit-finance — wants to 
leave billions of dollars on the table, then it does 
not follow that states should do the same. 
Indeed, a thrifty and lean low-tax state, as many 
so-called red states aspire to be, should be 
especially wary of leaving money on the table. 
These states wisely did not sit idly by and let 
Quill enable particular remote sellers to erode 
their sales tax bases, so why let some 
corporations erode their corporate tax bases?
And then what of the so-called blue states? 
A progressive personal income tax in Illinois is 
a sensible reform, but how could there have 
been no time for a quick repatriation bill? There 
was certainly time for discussion of the SALT 
cap workarounds in many blue states, but 
taxing the repatriation could have been used to 
soften the blow as well. Yet, crickets. And we 
have not even gotten around to asking why 
states have not conformed to the global 
intangible low-taxed income or the base erosion 
and antiabuse tax regimes or moved back to 
worldwide mandatory combination, especially 
now that it looks like the OECD is seriously 
considering versions of it as to non-routine 
profits.3
Perhaps when the next recession comes 
states will be more thoughtful, but at that point, 
the business community will argue that a 
recession is a terrible time to raise taxes on 
business and, in any event, taxes on profits will 
not raise much revenue. In other words, 
whatever combination of forces is stymieing 
states now will likely remain formidable.
We will do our best to tackle the only part of 
the problem that we can, which is to let states 
know as clearly as possible that they are 
missing relatively easy and sensible 
opportunities to improve their tax systems.
To that end, we will return to the issue of the 
repatriation. Clearly, states can still — and 
should — conform to GILTI4 and the BEAT, but 
can they still tax the repatriation? The answer is 
yes. First, the generous structure of the 
repatriation backloads when a taxpayer can 
elect to have its earnings deemed returned. 
Thus, a state can tax the 84 percent of 
repatriation deemed returned for the next six 
years for those taxpayers that elected to defer, 
which we presume to be most if not all.5 The rate 
applied to these revenues can be higher than the 
rate applied to ordinary corporate revenues. 
This can be justified as a kind of penalty/
attempt to recoup the time value of money.
Second, we think a state can go back and tax 
the full repatriation as well.6 After all, the TCJA 
gave the states a lot to respond to, and the 
structure of the repatriation is such that 
taxpayers will not suffer much harm to their 
reliance interests if a state now taxes the 
repatriation. The income was deemed returned 
anyway — so the taxpayer could not have done 
anything differently. Indeed, it is very unlikely 
that the statute of limitations has run on any of 
these tax years. A state could also justify its 
delay by noting that there was a prominent 
argument that the repatriated earnings would 
come home and lead to an investment bonanza. 
3
OECD, “Secretariat Proposal for a ‘Unified Approach’ Under Pillar 
One” (2019).
4
Shanske and Gamage, “States Should Conform to GILTI, Part 3: 




We owe this argument to Jordan Barry, though we fear that we do 
not do it justice. See Jordan Barry, “The Transition (Under-) Tax” 
(forthcoming). For a thorough discussion of the law of retroactivity, see 
Michael T. Fatale, “Connecting Dot: Retroactive State Tax Statutes and 
U.S. v. Carlton,” State Tax Notes, June 18, 2018, p. 1169.
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And so a state might have been waiting to tax 
the bonanza. As has been well documented, 
there has been no such investment flurry, just a 
flurry of stock buybacks that advantage the 
already advantaged.7 So there is another 
reasonable reason for states to act now.
We conclude where we began. States and 
localities are the primary providers of many 
government services, such as public safety and 
public schools. Though our federal system 
assigns them substantial — and growing — 
governmental responsibilities, the states are, to 
a considerable extent, left on their own as to 
raising revenues. No matter how much revenue 
a state wishes to collect, all states should seek to 
raise those revenues as fairly and efficiently as 
possible. The TCJA has given states several 
opportunities to raise revenue more fairly and 
efficiently than many of their current revenue 
tools, but so far the states have not acted. We 
hesitate to say that we see any trends, but if one 
squints then one might just see some signs that 
states are stepping up.8 
7
See, e.g., Nico Grant and Ian King, “Big Tech’s Big Tax Ruse: Industry 
Splurges on Buybacks,” Bloomberg, Apr. 14, 2019 (“Some of the largest 
U.S. technology companies pushed for a corporate tax overhaul in 2017 
by suggesting they would go on hiring sprees and boost the economy. 
Just over a year after getting what they wanted, data show these firms 
gave most of their huge tax savings to investors.”); and Michael 
Smolyansky, Gustavo Suarez, and Alexandra Tabova, “U.S. 
Corporations’ Repatriation of Offshore Profits,” Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, Sept. 4, 2018 (“The analysis detailed here 
suggests that funds repatriated in 2018:Q1 have been associated with a 
dramatic increase in share buybacks.”).
8
See Nebraska’s approach to the repatriation, Aaron Davis, “State 
Won’t Treat Repatriated Income As Dividend,” Tax Notes State, Sept. 23, 
2019, p. 1272; and New Hampshire’s approach to GILTI, Jennifer 
McLoughlin, “Compromise Budget Deal Would Tax Some GILTI,” Tax 
Notes State, Sept. 30, 2019, p. 1383.
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